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Abstract—With the proliferation of mobile devices and the
internet of things, developing principled solutions for privacy
in time series applications has become increasingly important.
While differential privacy is the gold standard for database
privacy, many time series applications require a different kind
of guarantee, and a number of recent works have used some
form of inferential privacy to address these situations.
However, a major barrier to using inferential privacy in
practice is its lack of graceful composition – even if the same
or related sensitive data is used in multiple releases that are
safe individually, the combined release may have poor privacy
properties. In this paper, we study composition properties of
a form of inferential privacy called Pufferfish when applied
to time-series data. We show that while general Pufferfish
mechanisms may not compose gracefully, a specific Pufferfish
mechanism, called the Markov Quilt Mechanism, which was
recently introduced by [9], has strong composition properties
comparable to that of pure differential privacy when applied
to time series data.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the proliferation of mobile devices and the internet of
things, large amounts of time series data are being collected,
stored and mined to draw inferences about the physical
environment. Examples include activity recordings of el-
derly patients to determine the state of their health, power
consumption data of residential and commercial buildings
to predict power demand responses, location trajectories of
users over time to deliver suitable advertisements, among
many others. Much of this information is extremely sensitive
– activity recordings yield information about what the patient
is doing all day, power consumption of a residence can reveal
occupancy, and location trajectories can reveal activities of
the subjects. It is therefore imperative to develop principled
and rigorous solutions that address privacy in these kinds of
time series applications.
The gold standard for privacy in database applications
has long been differential privacy [2]; the typical setting
is that each record corresponds to the private value of a
single person, and the goal is to design algorithms that
can compute functions such as classifiers and clusterings
on the sensitive data, while hiding the participation of a
single person. Differential privacy has many good properties,
such as post-processing invariance and graceful composition,
which have led to its high popularity and practical use over
the years.
Unfortunately, many of the time-series applications de-
scribed above require a different kind of privacy guarantee.
Consider the physical activity monitoring application for
example, where the goal is to hide activity at small time
intervals while revealing long-term activity patterns. Here
the entire dataset is about a single patient, and hence hiding
their participation will not be useful. An alternative is entry
differential privacy, which hides the inclusion of activity
at any given single time point in the data; since activities
at close-by time points are highly correlated, this will not
prevent an adversary from inferring the activity at the hidden
time. To address these issues, a number of recent works [9],
[8], [4], [10] have used the notion of inferential privacy,
where the goal is to prevent an adversary who has some
prior knowledge, from inferring the state of the time series
at any particular time.
A clean and elegant framework for inferential privacy
is Pufferfish [7], which is our privacy framework of
choice. Pufferfish models a privacy problem through a triple
(S,Q,Θ); here S is a set of secrets, which is a set of
potential facts that we may wish to hide. Q is a set of tuples
of the form (si, sj) where si, sj ∈ S which represent which
pairs of secrets should be indistinguishable to an adversary.
Finally, Θ is a set of distributions that can plausibly generate
the data and describes prior beliefs of an adversary. A
mechanism A is said to satisfy ǫ-Pufferfish privacy in the
framework (S,Q,Θ) if an adversary’s posterior odds of
every pair of secrets (si, sj) in Q is within a factor of
eǫ of its prior odds. Pufferfish models the physical activity
monitoring application as follows – S consists of elements
of the form sat , which represent patient has activity a at time
t, Q consists of tuples of the form (sat , s
b
t) for all t and all
activity pairs (a, b), and Θ consists of a set of Markov Chains
that describe how activities transition across time.
However, a major limitation of Pufferfish privacy is that
except under very special conditions, it often does not com-
pose gracefully – even if the same or related sensitive data is
used in multiple Pufferfish releases that are individually safe,
the combined release may have poor privacy guarantees [7].
In many real applications, same or related data is often used
across applications, and this forms a major barrier to the
practical applicability of Pufferfish.
In this paper, we study this question, and we show a
number of composition results for Pufferfish privacy for
time series applications in the framework described above.
Our results look at two scenarios – sequential and parallel
composition; the first is when the same sensitive data is
used across multiple computations, and the second is when
disjoint sections of the Markov Chain are used in different
computations. Note that while in differential privacy, com-
position in the second case is trivial, this does not apply
to Pufferfish, as information about the state of one segment
of a Markov Chain can leak information about a correlated
segment.
For sequential composition, we show that while in general
we cannot expect any arbitrary Pufferfish mechanism to
compose gracefully even for the time series framework
described above, a specific mechanism, called the Markov
Quilt Mechanism, that was recently introduced by [9], does
compose linearly, much like pure differential privacy. For
parallel composition, we provide two results; first, we show
a general result that applies to any Pufferfish mechanism
in the framework described above and shows that the pri-
vacy guarantee obtained from two releases on two disjoint
segments A and B of the Markov Chain is the worse of
the two guarantees plus a correction factor that depends on
the distance between A and B and properties of the chain.
Second, we show that if the two segments of the chain
are far enough, then, under some mild conditions, using a
specific version of the Markov Quilt Mechanism can provide
even better parallel composition guarantees, matching those
of differential privacy. Our results thus demonstrate that
the Markov Quilt Mechanism and its versions have strong
composition properties when applied to Markov Chains, thus
motivating their use for real time-series applications.
A. Related Work
Since graceful composition is a critical property of any
privacy definition, there has been a significant amount of
work on differential privacy composition [2], and it is known
to compose rather gracefully. [2] shows that pure differential
privacy composes linearly under sequential composition; for
parallel composition, the guarantees are even better, and the
combined privacy guarantee is the worst of the guarantees
offered by the individual releases. [3] shows that a variant of
differential privacy, called approximate differential privacy,
has even better sequential composition properties than pure
differential privacy. Optimal composition guarantees for both
pure and approximate differential privacy are established
by [6]. Finally, [1] provides a method for numerically calcu-
lating privacy guarantees obtained from composing a number
of approximate differentially private mechanisms.
In contrast, little is known about the composition prop-
erties of inferential privacy. [7] provides examples to show
that Pufferfish may not sequentially compose, except in some
very special cases. [5] shows that a specialized version of
Pufferfish, called Blowfish, which is somewhat closer to
differential privacy does have graceful sequential composi-
tion properties; however, Blowfish does not apply to time-
series data. [9] provides limited privacy guarantees for the
Markov Quilt Mechanism under serial composition; however,
these guarantees are worse than linear, and they only apply
under much more stringent conditions – namely, if all the
mechanisms use the same active Markov Quilt.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Time Series Data and Markov Chains
It is common to model time-series data as Markov chains.
Example 1. Suppose we have data tracking the physical
activity of a subject: (X1, X2, . . . , XT ) where Xt denotes
activity (e.g, running, sitting, etc) of the subject at time t. Our
goal is to provide the aggregate activity pattern of the subject
by releasing (an approximate) histogram, while preventing an
adversary from finding out what the subject was doing at a
specific time t.
Example 2. Suppose we have power consumption data
for a house: (X1, X2, . . . , XT ), where Xt is the power
level in Watts at time t. Our goal is to output a general
power consumption pattern of the household by releasing (an
approximate) histogram of the power levels, while preventing
an adversary from inferring the power level at a specific time
t; specific power levels may be sensitive information, as the
presence or absence of family members at a given time can
be inferred with the power level.
Markov Chains. Temporal correlation in this kind of time-
series data is usually captured by a Markov chain X1 →
X2 → . . . → XT , where [k] represents all possible states
and Xt ∈ [k] represents the state at time t. In Example 1,
Xt represents the activity performed by the subject at time
t and [k] represents all possible activities. In Example 2, Xt
represents the power level of the house at time t and [k]
represents all possible power levels. The transition from one
state to another is determined by a transition matrix P , and
state of X1 is drawn from an initial distribution q.
B. The Pufferfish Privacy Framework
Pufferfish privacy framework captures the privacy in these
examples. We next define it and specify how the examples
mentioned fit in.
A Pufferfish framework is specified by three parameters
– a set of secret S, a set of secret pairs Q and a set
of data distributions Θ. S consists of possible facts about
the data that need to be protected. Q ⊆ S × S is a set
of secret pairs that we want to be indistinguishable. Θ is
a set of distributions that can plausibly generate the data
and captures the correlation among records; each θ ∈ Θ
represents one adversary’s belief of the data. The goal of
Pufferfish framework is to ensure indistinguishability of the
secrets pairs in Q under any belief in Θ. Now we define
Pufferfish privacy under the framework (S,Q,Θ).
Definition 2.1 (Pufferfish Privacy): A privacy mechanism
M is said to be ǫ-Pufferfish private in a framework (S,Q,Θ)
if for datasets X ∼ θ where θ ∈ Θ, for all secret pairs
(si, sj) ∈ Q and for all w ∈ Range(M), we have
e−ǫ ≤
PM,θ(M(X) = w|si, θ)
PM,θ(M(X) = w|sj , θ)
≤ eǫ (1)
when si and sj are such that P (si|θ) 6= 0, P (sj |θ) 6= 0.
Pufferfish Framework for Time-Series Data: We can
model the time-series data described in the previous section
with the following Pufferfish framework.
Let the database be a Markov chain X = (X1 → X2 →
. . .→ XT ), where each Xi lies in the state space [k]. Such
a Markov Chain may be fully described by a tuple (q, P )
where q is an initial distribution and P is a transition matrix.
Let sia denote the event thatXi takes value a ∈ [k]. The set
of secrets is S = {sia : a ∈ [k], i ∈ [T ]}, and the set of secret
pairs is Q = {(sia, s
i
b) : a, b ∈ [k], a 6= b, i ∈ [T ]}. Each
θ = (qθ, Pθ) ∈ Θ represents a Markov chain of the above
structure with transition matrix Pθ and initial distribution qθ.
In the first example, the state space represents the set of
all possible activities and sia or Xi = a represents the event
that the subject is engaged in activity a at time i. Q indicates
that we do not want the adversary to distinguish whether the
subject is engaged in activity a or b at a given time. In
the second example, the state space represents the set of all
possible power levels and sia or Xi = a represents the event
that the power level of the house is a at time i. Q indicates
that we do not want the adversary to distinguish whether the
house is at power level a or b at a given time.
C. Notation
We use X with a lowercase subscript, for example, Xi,
to denote a single node in the Markov chain, and X with
an uppercase subscript, for example, XA, to denote a set of
nodes in the Markov chain. For a set of nodes XA we use
the notation card(XA) to denote the number of nodes in
XA.
For I ⊆ [T ], we use XI to denote the subchain {Xi}i∈I ⊆
X , and we use SI to denote {sia : a ∈ [k], i ∈ I}, Q
I to
denote {(sia, s
i
b) : a, b ∈ [k], a 6= b, i ∈ I}.
D. The Markov Quilt Mechanism
[9] proposes the Markov Quilt Mechanism (MQM). It can
be used to achieve Pufferfish privacy in the case where Θ
consists of Bayesian networks, of which Markov chains are
special cases. We restate the algorithm and the corresponding
definitions in this section.
To understand the main idea of MQM, consider a Markov
chain θ. Any two nodes in θ are correlated to a certain degree,
which means releasing the state of one node potentially
provides information on the state of the other. However, the
amount of correlation between two nodes usually decays as
the distance between them grows. Consider a node Xi in
the Markov chain. The nodes close to Xi can be highly
influenced by its state, while the nodes that are far away
are almost independent. Therefore to hide the effect of a
node Xi on the result of a query, MQM adds noise that
is roughly proportional to the number of nearby nodes, and
uses a small correction term to account for the effect of the
almost independent set.
To measure the amount of dependence, [9] defines max-
influence.
Definition 2.2 (max-influence): The max-influence of a
variable Xi on a set of variables XA under Θ is
eΘ(XA|Xi) = (2)
sup
θ∈Θ
max
a,b∈[k]
max
xA∈[k]card(XA)
log
P (XA = xA|Xi = a, θ)
P (XA = xA|Xi = b, θ)
.
A higher max-influence means higher level of correlation
between Xi and XA, and max-influence becomes 0 if Xi
and XA are independent. For simplicity, we would use eθ to
denote e{θ}.
In a Markov chain, the max-influence can be calculated
exactly given the transition matrix Pθ and initial distribution
qθ . It can also be approximated using properties of the
stationary distribution and eigen-gap of the transition matrix
if the Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic. [9] shows
the following upper bound of max-influence.
Lemma 2.3: For an irreducible and aperiodic Markov
chain described by θ = (qθ, Pθ), let P
∗
θ be the time reversal
of Pθ . Let πθ be the stationary distribution of θ and π
min
θ =
minx∈[k] πθ(x) and let gθ = min{1 − |λ| : PθP
∗
θ x =
λx, |λ| < 1} be the eigen-gap of PθP ∗θ . If πθ > 0, gθ > 0
and a, b ≥ 2 log(1/π
min
θ )
gθ
, then for XQ = {Xi−a, Xi+b},
eθ(XQ|Xi) (3)
≤2 log
πminθ + exp(−gθa/2)
πminθ − exp(−gθa/2)
+ log
πminθ + exp(−gθb/2)
πminθ − exp(−gθb/2)
.
To facilitate efficient search for an almost independent set,
[9] then defines a Markov Quilt which takes into account the
structure a Markov chain.
Definition 2.4 (Markov Quilt): A set of nodes XQ, Q ⊂
[n] in a Markov chain X is a Markov Quilt for a node Xi
if the following conditions hold:
1) Deleting XQ partitions X into parts XN and XR such
that X = XN ∪XQ ∪XR and Xi ∈ XN .
2) For all xR ∈ [k]card(XR), all xQ ∈ [k]card(XQ) and
for all a ∈ [k], P (XR = xR|XQ = xQ, Xi = a) =
P (XR = xR|XQ = xQ).
Thus, XR is independent of Xi conditioned on XQ.
Intuitively, XR is a set of “remote” nodes that are far from
Xi, and XN is the set of “nearby” nodes; XN and XR are
separated by the Markov Quilt XQ.
A Markov Quilt XQ (with corresponding XN and XR)
of Xi is minimal if among all other Markov Quilts with the
same nearby set XN , it has the minimal cardinality.
Lemma 2.5: In a Markov chain X = {Xk}Tk=1, the set of
minimal Markov Quilts of a node Xi is
SQ,i = {{Xi−a, Xi+b}, {Xi−a}, {Xi+b}, ∅
|1 ≤ a ≤ i− 1, 1 ≤ b ≤ T − i}. (4)
That is, one node on its left and one node to its right
can form a Markov Quilt for Xi. Additionally, a Markov
Quilt can also be formed by only one node Xi−a (or Xi+b),
in which case XN = {Xj}Tj=i−a+1 (or {Xj}
i+b−1
j=1 ); and the
empty Markov Quilt is also allowed, with correspondingXN
as the whole chain and XR as the empty set.
The Markov Quilt Mechanism for Markov chain is restated
in Algorithm 1. Intuitively, for each nodeXi, MQM searches
over all the Markov Quilts, finds the one with the least
amount of noise needed, and finally adds the noise that is
sufficient to protect privacy of all nodes.
It was shown in [9] that MQM guarantees ǫ-Pufferfish
privacy in the framework (S,Q,Θ) in Section II-A provided
that the query F in Algorithm 1 is 1-Lipschitz. Note that any
Lipschitz function can be scaled to 1-Lipschitz function.
Algorithm 1 MQM(Dataset D, 1-Lipschitz query F , Θ,
privacy parameter ǫ)
for all θ ∈ Θ do
for all Xi do
for all Markov Quilts XQ ∈ SQ,i where SQ,i is in 4
do
Calculate e{θ}(XQ|Xi)
if e{θ}(XQ|Xi) < ǫ then
σθi (XQ) =
card(XN )
ǫ−e{θ}(XQ|Xi)
/*score of XQ*/
else
σθi (XQ) =∞
end if
end for
σθi = minXQ∈SQ,i σ
θ
i (XQ)
end for
σθmax = maxi σ
θ
i
end for
σmax = maxθ∈Θ σ
θ
max
return F (D) + σmax · Z , where Z ∼ Lap(1)
Observe that Algorithm 1 does not specify how to com-
pute max-influence. [9] proposes two versions of MQM –
MQMExact which computes the exact max-influence using
Definition 2.2, and MQMApprox which computes an upper
bound of max-influence using Lemma 2.3.
Previous Results on Composition
To design more sophisticated privacy preserving algo-
rithms, we need to understand the privacy guarantee of
the combination of two private algorithms, which is called
composition.
There are two types of composition – parallel and se-
quential. The first describes the case where multiple privacy
algorithms are applied on disjoint data sets, while the second
describes the case where they are applied to the same data.
A major advantage of differential privacy is that it com-
poses gracefully. [2] shows that applying K differentially
private algorithms, each with ǫk-differential privacy, guaran-
tees maxk ǫk-differential privacy under parallel composition,
and
∑
k ǫk-differential privacy under sequential composition.
Better and more sophisticated composition results have been
shown for approximate differential privacy [3] [6].
Unlike differential privacy, Pufferfish privacy does not
always compose linearly [7]. However, we can still hope
to achieve composition for special Pufferfish mechanisms or
for special classes of data distributions Θ.
[9] does not provide any parallel composition result. The
following sequential composition result for MQM on Markov
chain is provided.
Theorem 2.6: Let {Fk}Kk=1 be a set of Lipschitz queries,
(S,Q,Θ) be a Pufferfish framework as defined in Sec-
tion II-A, andD be a database. Given fixed Markov Quilt sets
{SQ,i}ni=1 for all Xi, let Mk(D) denote the Markov Quilt
Mechanism that releases Fk(D) with ǫk-Pufferfish privacy
under (S,Q,Θ) using Markov Quilt sets {SQ,i}ni=1. Then
releasing (M1(D), . . . ,MK(D)) guaranteesKmaxk∈[K] ǫk-
Pufferfish privacy under (S,Q,Θ).
Notice that this result holds only when the same Markov
Quilts are used for all releases. Moreover, the final privacy
guarantee depends on the worst privacy guarantees maxk ǫk
over the K releases. In practice, it might not be easy to
enforce the MQM to use the same Markov Quilts at all
releases; and if even one of the releases guarantees large
ǫk, the final privacy guarantee can be bad.
III. RESULTS
As discussed in the previous section, general Pufferfish
mechanisms do not compose linearly. However, we can
exploit the properties of data distributions – Markov chains,
and properties of the specific Pufferfish mechanism – MQM
to obtain new parallel composition result as well as improved
sequential composition result.
A. Parallel Composition
Setup: Consider the Pufferfish framework (S,Q,Θ) as de-
scribed in Section II-A. Parallel composition can be formu-
lated as follows.
Suppose there are two subchains of the Markov chain,
XA = X [T1,T2] and XB = X [T3,T4] where 1 ≤ T1 < T2 <
T3 < T4 ≤ T ; and correspondingly, let SA = S [T1,T2],
QA = Q[T1,T2] and SB = S [T3,T4], QB = Q[T3,T4].
Suppose Alice has access to subchain XA and wants to
release Lipchitz query FA while guaranteeing ǫA-Pufferfish
Privacy under framework (SA, QA,Θ); and Bob has access
to XB and wants to release Lipchitz query FB while guaran-
teeing ǫB-Pufferfish Privacy under framework (SB, QB,Θ).
Our goal is to determine how strong the Pufferfish privacy
guarantee we can get for releasing (MA(X
A),MB(X
B)).
A General Result for Markov Chains
Theorem 3.1: Suppose MA,MB are two mechanisms
such that MA(X
A) guarantees ǫA-Pufferfish privacy un-
der framework (SA, QA,Θ) and MB(X
B) guarantees ǫB-
Pufferfish privacy under framework (SB, QB,Θ). Then re-
leasing (MA(X
A),MB(X
B)) guarantees max{min{ǫA +
ǫB, ǫA+eΘ(XT2 |XT3)},min{ǫB+ǫA, ǫB+eΘ(XT3 |XT2)}}-
Pufferfish Privacy under framework (SA∪SB, QA∪QB,Θ).
Comparing with parallel composition for differential pri-
vacy, here we have the extra terms eΘ(XT2 |XT3) and
eΘ(XT3 |XT2) which capture the correlation between XT2
and XT3 – the end point of the first subchain and the starting
point of the second. This is to be expected, since there is
correlation among states in the Markov chain. Intuitively, if
the two subchains are close enough, releasing information
on one can cause a privacy breach of the other.
MQM on Markov Chains
Let MQM(D,F, ǫ, (S,Q,Θ)) denote the output of MQM
on dataset D, query function F , privacy parameter ǫ and
Pufferfish framework (S,Q,Θ). Suppose Alice and Bob use
MQMApprox to publish MQM(XA,FA, ǫA, (SA, QA,Θ))
and MQM(XB,FB, ǫB, (SB, QB,Θ)) respectively.
Before we establish a parallel composition result, we begin
with a definition.
Definition 3.2: (Active Markov Quilt) Consider an in-
stance of the Markov Quilt Mechanism M . We say that
a Markov Quilt XQ (with corresponding XN , XR) for a
node Xi is active with respect to θ ∈ Θ if XQ =
argminXQ∈SQ,i σ
θ
i (XQ), and thus σ
θ
i (XQ) = σ
θ
i .
Theorem 3.3: Suppose we run MQMApprox to release
(MQM(XA,FA, ǫA, (SA, QA,Θ)),MQM(XB,FB, ǫB, (SB,
QB,Θ))). If the following conditions hold:
1) for any θ ∈ Θ, there exists some Xi ∈ XA and Xj ∈
XB such that the active Markov Quilts of Xi and Xj
with respect to θ are of the form {Xi−a, Xi+b} and
{Xj−a′ , Xj+b′} respectively for some a, b, a′, b′, and
2) T3 − T2 ≥ max{T2 − T1, T4 − T3}, i.e., XA, XB are
far from each other compared to their lengths,
then the release guarantees max(ǫA, ǫB)-Pufferfish Privacy
under the framework (SA ∪ SB, QA ∪QB,Θ).
The main intuition is as follows. Note that we require
the active Markov Quilt of some Xi ∈ XA to be of the
form {Xi−a, Xi+b}. For any Xi′ ∈ XA, the correction
factor added to account for the effect of the nodes {Xk ∈
XA}k≥i+b also automatically accounts for the effect of
XB = X [T3,T4], provided that [T3, T4] does not overlap with
[i′ − a, i′ + b]. This is ensured by the second condition in
Theorem 3.3.
B. Sequential Composition
Consider the case when Alice and Bob have access to
the entire Markov Chain X = {Xt}Tt=1, and want to
publish Lipschitz queries FA, FB with Pufferfish parameters
ǫA, ǫB and Pufferfish framework (S,Q,Θ) as described in
Section II-A.
General Results for Markov Chains
First, we show that an arbitrary Pufferfish mechanism
does not compose linearly even when Θ consists of Markov
chains.
Theorem 3.4: There exists a Markov chain X , a function
F and mechanisms MA, MB such that both MA(X) and
MB(X) guarantee ǫ-Pufferfish privacy under framework
(S,Q,Θ), yet releasing (MA(X),MB(X)) does not guar-
antee 2ǫ-Pufferfish privacy under framework (S,Q,Θ).
Now we show that arbitrary Pufferfish mechanisms com-
pose with a correction factor that depends on the max-
divergence between the joint and product distributions of
MA(X) and MB(X). We define max-divergence first.
Definition 3.5 (max-divergence): Let p and q be two
distributions with the same support. The max-divergence
D∞(p, q) between them is defined as:
D∞
(
X ‖ Y
)
= sup
x∈support(p)
log
p(x)
q(x)
.
Now we state the composition theorem.
Theorem 3.6: Suppose MA,MB are two mechanisms
used by Alice and Bob which guarantee ǫA and ǫB-Pufferfish
privacy respectively under framework (S,Q,Θ). If there
exists E, such that for all si ∈ S, θ ∈ Θ,
D∞
(
P (MA(X),MB(X)|si, θ) ‖
P (MA(X)|si, θ)P (MB(X)|si, θ)
)
≤ E
D∞
(
P (MA(X)|si, θ)P (MB(X)|si, θ) ‖
P (MA(X),MB(X)|si, θ)
)
≤ E,
then the releasing (MA(X),MB(X)) guarantees (ǫA+ ǫB+
2E)-Pufferfish Privacy under framework (S,Q,Θ).
The max-divergence between the joint and product dis-
tributions of MA(X) and MB(X) measures the amount of
dependence between the two releases. The more independent
they are, the smaller the max-divergence would be and the
stronger privacy the algorithm guarantees.
MQM on Markov Chains
We next show that we can further exploit the properties
of MQM to provide tighter privacy guarantees than that
provided in [9].
Suppose Alice and Bob use MQM to achieve Pufferfish
privacy under the same framework (S,Q,Θ). We show
that when Θ consists of Markov chains, even if the two
runs of MQM use different Markov Quilts, MQM still
compose linearly. This result applies to both MQMExact and
MQMApprox.
Theorem 3.7: For the Pufferfish framework (S,Q,Θ) de-
fined in Section II-A, releasing MQM(X,Fk, ǫk, (S,Q,Θ))
for all k ∈ [K] guarantees
∑
k∈[K] ǫk-Pufferfish privacy
under framework (S,Q,Θ).
This result shows that MQM on Markov chain achieves
the same composition guarantee as pure differential privacy.
Comparing to the composition results provided in [9], i.e.,
Theorem 2.6, Theorem 3.7 provides better privacy guarantee
under less restricted conditions. It does not require the
same Markov Quilts to be used in the two runs of MQM.
Moreover, the privacy guarantee is better when ǫk’s are
different –
∑
k ǫk as opposite to Kmaxk ǫk.
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, motivated by emerging sensing applica-
tions, we study composition properties of Pufferfish, a form
of inferential privacy, for certain kinds of time-series data.
We provide both sequential and parallel composition results.
Our results illustrate that while Pufferfish does not have
strong composition properties in general, variants of the
recently introduced Markov Quilt Mechanism that guarantees
Pufferfish privacy for time series data, do compose well,
and have strong composition properties comparable to pure
differential privacy. We believe that these results make these
mechanisms attractive for practical time series applications.
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APPENDIX
A. Proofs for Parallel Composition Results
Proof: (of Theorem 3.1) Consider the case when the
secret pair is (XT2 = a,XT2 = b) for some a, b. For any
θ ∈ Θ, we have
p(MA(X
A) = wA,MB(X
B) = wB|XT2 = a, θ)
p(MA(XA) = wA,MB(XB) = wB|XT2 = b, θ)
=
p(MA(X
A) = wA|XT2 = a, θ)
p(MA(XA) = wA|XT2 = b, θ)
×
p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT2 = a, θ)
p(MB(XB) = wB|XT2 = b, θ)
since XA and XB are independent conditioned on XT2 . The
first ratio is upper bounded by eǫA sinceMA is ǫA-Pufferfish
private. The second ratio can be written as
p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT2 = a, θ)
p(MB(XB) = wB|XT2 = b, θ)
=
∫
p(MB(X
B) = wB, XT3 = xT3 |XT2 = a, θ)dxT3∫
p(MB(XB) = wB, XT3 = xT3 |XT2 = b, θ)dxT3
=
∫
p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT3 = xT3 , θ)
p(XT3 = xT3 |XT2 = a, θ)dxT3∫
p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT3 = xT3 , θ)
p(XT3 = xT3 |XT2 = b, θ)dxT3
(5)
where the second equality follows from the fact that XB is
independent of XT2 given XT3 .
Since maxa,b,xT3
p(XT3=xT3 |XT2=a,θ)
p(XT3=xT3 |XT2=b,θ)
≤ eeθ(XT3 |XT2) and
eθ(XT3 |XT2) ≤ eΘ(XT3 |XT2), (5) can be upper bounded by
eeΘ(XT3 |XT2).
On the other hand, (5) is also upper bounded by
maxxT3 p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT3 = xT3 , θ)∫
p(XT3 = xT3 |XT2 = a, θ)dxT3
minxT3 p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT3 = xT3 , θ)∫
p(XT3 = xT3 |XT2 = b, θ)dxT3
=
maxxT3 p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT3 = xT3 , θ)
minxT3 p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT3 = xT3 , θ)
≤ eǫB ,
where the equality follows becasue
∫
p(XT3 = xT3 |XT2 =
xT2 , θ)dxT3 = 1 for any xT2 . Therefore (5) is upper bounded
by min{eeΘ(XT3 |XT2 ), eǫB}.
Combining the bound of the first ratio, we get
p(MA(X
A) = wA,MB(X
B) = wB|XT2 = a, θ)
p(MA(XA) = wA,MB(XB) = wB|XT2 = b, θ)
≤min{eǫA+eΘ(XT3 |XT2), eǫA+ǫB}.
If the secret pair is (Xi = a,Xi = b, θ) for some a, b where
T1 ≤ i < T2, we have
p(MA(X
A) = wA,MB(X
B) = wB|Xi = a, θ)
=
∫
p(MA(X
A) = wA,MB(X
B) = wB, XT2 = xT2 |
Xi = a, θ)dxT2
=
∫
p(MA(X
A) = wA,MB(X
B) = wB, Xi = a|XT2 =
xT2 , θ)p(XT2 = xT2 , θ)/p(Xi = a, θ)dxT2
=
∫
p(MA(X
A) = wA, Xi = a|XT2 = xT2 , θ)p(MB(X
B) =
wB|XT2 = xT2 , θ)p(XT2 = xT2 , θ)/p(Xi = a, θ)dxT2
=
∫
p(MA(X
A) = wA, XT2 = xT2 |Xi = a, θ)
p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT2 = xT2 , θ)dxT2 ,
where the third equality is because XA, Xi are independent
of XB given XT2 .
Therefore we have
p(MA(X
A) = wA,MB(X
B) = wB|Xi = a, θ)
p(MA(XA) = wA,MB(XB) = wB|Xi = b, θ)
=
∫
p(MA(X
A) = wA, XT2 = xT2 |Xi = a, θ)
p(MB(XB) = wB|XT2 = xT2 , θ)dxT2∫
p(MA(X
A) = wA, XT2 = xT2 |Xi = b, θ)
p(MB(XB) = wB|XT2 = xT2 , θ)dxT2
≤
maxxT2 p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT2 = xT2 , θ)
minxT2 p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT2 = xT2 , θ)∫
p(MA(X
A) = wA, XT2 = xT2 |Xi = a, θ)dxT2∫
p(MA(XA) = wA, XT2 = xT2 |Xi = b, θ)dxT2
≤
maxxT2 p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT2 = xT2 , θ)
minxT2 p(MB(X
B) = wB|XT2 = xT2 , θ)
p(MA(X
A) = wA|Xi = a, θ)
p(MA(XA) = wA|Xi = b, θ)
≤min{eǫA+eΘ(XT3 |XT2), eǫA+ǫB},
where the last step follows from our previous bound for (5)
and the fact that MA guarantees ǫA Pufferfish privacy.
The same analysis can be applied to the case where the
secret is (Xi = a,Xi = b, θ) for some T3 ≤ i ≤ T4 and the
upper bound is min{eǫB+eΘ(XT2 |XT3), eǫA+ǫB}.
Proof: (of Theorem 3.3) Denote the noises added by
MQM for Alice and Bob by ZA, ZB respectively. Consider
any secret pair of the form (XAi = a,X
A
i = b). We want to
upper bound the following ratio for any wA, wB, θ, i, a, b.
P (FA(X
A) + ZA = wA,FB(X
B) + ZB = wB|X
A
i = a, θ)
P (FA(XA) + ZA = wA,FB(XB) + ZB = wB|XAi = b, θ)
.
By assumption, there exists some Xj ∈ X
A whose
active Markov Quilt is XQ,j = {Xj−a, Xj+b} with cor-
responding XR,j and XN,j; and we have σ
θ
max ≥ σ
θ
j =
card(XN,j)/(ǫ− eθ(XQ,j |Xj)).
The main idea of the proof is that we can “borrow” the
Markov Quilt of Xj as the Markov Quilt for any Xi ∈ XA
because doing so will not increase the noise scale σθmax.
There are three cases:
1) If i − a ≥ 1 and i + b ≤ T2, then let XQ =
{Xi−a, Xi+b} (we omit the subscript i for simplicity)
with corresponding XR = {Xk}1≤k<i−a or i+b<k≤T2
and XN =
{Xk}i−a<k<i+b.
2) If i − a ≥ 1 and i + b > T2, then let
XQ = {Xi−a, Xi+b} with corresponding XR =
{Xk}1≤k<i−a and XN = {Xk}i−a<k<i+b.
3) If i + b ≤ T2 and i − a ≤ 0, then let XQ = {Xi+b}
with corresponding XN = {Xk}1≤k<i+b and XR =
{Xk}i+b<k≤T2 .
Notice that when max-influence is approximated with
Lemma 2.3, for any i and j, we have
eθ({Xi−a, Xi+a}|Xi) = eθ({Xj−a, Xj+a}|Xj), i.e.,
the max-influence is only affected by the relative distance
between Xi and its Markov Quilt.
Therefore, in the first two cases, we have σθi (XQ) =
σθj (XQ,j) since the max-influence and the size of nearby
nodes are the same; in the last case, since eθ(XQ|Xi) ≤
eθ(XQ,j |Xj) and card(XN ) ≤ card(XN,j), we have
σθi (XQ) ≤ σ
θ
j (XQ,j). Therefore we know that Lap(σ
θ
max)
suffices to protect Xi.
Let XR∪Q = XR ∪ XQ. We can split XR∪Q into two
parts, Xmid = {Xj ∈ XR∪Q, j > i} which is closer to the
middle of XA and XB, and Xout = {Xj ∈ XR∪Q, j < i}
which is closer to the boundary of the Markov chain. For
the three cases respectively, we have
1) Xmid = {Xk}i+b≤k≤T2 and Xout = {Xk}1≤k≤i−a.
2) Xmid = {Xi+b} and Xout = {Xk}1≤k≤i−a.
3) Xmid = {Xk}i+b≤k≤T2 and Xout = ∅.
By assumption, XA and XB are far enough, and thus
Xi+b /∈ XB and Xmid ∩XB = ∅.
Then we have
P (FA(X
A) + ZA = wA,FB(X
B) + ZB = wB|Xi = a, θ)
=
∫
P (FA(X
A) + ZA = wA,FB(X
B) + ZB = wB,
Xout = xout, Xmid = xmid|Xi = a, θ)dxoutdxmid
=
∫
P (FA(X
A) + ZA = wA,FB(X
B) + ZB = wB, Xout =
xout, Xi = a|Xmid = xmid, θ)P (Xmid = xmid|θ)/
P (Xi = a|θ)dxoutdxmid
=
∫
P (FA(X
A) + ZA = wA, Xout = xout, Xi = a|Xmid =
xmid, θ)P (FB(X
B) + ZB = wB|Xmid = xmid, θ)
P (Xmid = xmid|θ)/P (Xi = a|θ)dxoutdxmid
=
∫
P (FA(X
A) + ZA = wA, Xout = xout, Xmid = xmid|Xi = a,
θ)P (FB(X
B) + ZB = wB|Xmid = xmid, θ)dxoutdxmid,
where the third equality follows because Xmid separates X
B
with XA.
By Lemma 1.2, for any a,b and and xR∪Q,
P (FA(XA) + ZA = wA, XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a, θ)
P (FA(XA) + ZA = wA, XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b, θ)
≤ eǫA .
Therefore for any Xout, Xmid we have
P (FA(X
A) + ZA = wA, Xout = xout, Xmid = xmid|Xi = a, θ)
P (FB(XB) + ZB = wB|Xmid = xmid, θ)
P (FA(XA) + ZA = wA, Xout = xout, Xmid = xmid|Xi = b, θ)
P (FB(X
B) + ZB = wB|Xmid = xmid, θ)
≤ eǫA ,
and therefore
P (FA(XA) + ZA = wA,FB(XB) + ZB = wB|Xi = a, θ)
P (FA(XA) + ZA = wA,FB(XB) + ZB = wB|Xi = b, θ)
≤ max
xout,xmid
P (FA(XA) + ZA = wA, Xout = xout, Xmid = xmid|
Xi = a, θ)P (FB(XB) + ZB = wB|Xmid = xmid, θ)
P (FA(XA) + ZA = wA, Xout = xout, Xmid = xmid|
Xi = b, θ)P (FB(XB) + ZB = wB|Xmid = xmid, θ)
≤eǫA.
When the secret pair is of the form (XBi = a,X
B
i = b),
similar argument applies and the bound is eǫB .
Therefore for Pufferfish parameter (SA∪SB, QA∪QB,Θ),
(MQM(X,FA, ǫA, (SA, QA,Θ)),MQM(XB,FB, ǫB,
(SB, QB,Θ))) guaranteesmax(ǫA, ǫB)-Pufferfish Privacy.
B. Proofs for Sequential Composition Results
Proof: (of Theorem 3.4) Consider a Markov chain with
two nodes: X = {X1, X2} and state space {0, 1}. Let
P (X2 = 1|X1 = 1) = p, P (X2 = 1|X1 = 0) = q, i.e.,
the transition matrix is [1 − q, q; 1 − p, p]. Suppose the set
of secret pairs is Q = {(X1 = 0, X1 = 1)}. Let F be
the summation function, i.e., F (X) = X1 + X2. Suppose
mechanism M outputs F (X) + Z where Z = Lap(1).
Denote
S(w) =
p(F (X) + Z = w|X1 = 1)
p(F (X) + Z = w|X1 = 0)
D(w,w′) =
p(F (X) + Z = w,F (X) + Z = w′|X1 = 1)
p(F (X) + Z = w,F (X) + Z = w′|X1 = 0)
.
So M(X) guarantees logmaxw{S(w), 1/S(w)}-
Pufferfish privacy and (M(X),M(X)) guarantees
logmaxw,w′{D(w,w′), 1/D(w,w′)}-Pufferfish privacy.
We aim at proving that 2 log(S) < log(D), equivalently,
S2 < D.
Let w denote the event that F (X)+Z = w, and σ denote
the probability distribution of Z , i.e., Lap(1). We have
S(w) =
p(w|X1 = 1, X2 = 1)p(X2 = 1|X1 = 1)
p(w|X1 = 0, X2 = 1)p(X2 = 1|X1 = 0)
+p(w|X1 = 1, X2 = 0)p(X2 = 0|X1 = 1)
+p(w|X1 = 0, X2 = 0)p(X2 = 0|X1 = 0)
=
σ(w − 2)p+ σ(w − 1)(1− p)
σ(w − 1)q + σ(w)(1 − q)
and
D(w,w′) =
σ(w − 2)σ(w′ − 2)p+ σ(w − 1)σ(w′ − 1)(1− p)
σ(w − 1)σ(w′ − 1)q + σ(w)σ(w′)(1− q)
.
To simplify the analysis, we consider
D(w) = D(w,w) =
σ(2w − 4)p+ σ(2w − 2)(1− p)
σ(2w − 2)q + σ(2w)(1 − q)
which equals to maxw′=w{D(w,w′), 1/D(w,w′)}, and thus
is a lower bound of maxw,w′{D(w,w′), 1/D(w,w′)}.
There are in total 3 possible values of S(w) under different
w. Case 1: w ∈ (− inf, 0].
S(w) =
ew−2p+ ew−1(1− p)
ew−1q + ew(1 − q)
=
p+ e1(1− p)
e1q + e2(1− q)
Case 2: w ∈ [0, 1].
S(w) =
ew−2p+ ew−1(1− p)
ew−1q + e−w(1− q)
=
p+ e1(1− p)
e1q + e2−2w(1− q)
=
p+ e1(1 − p)
e1q + e2(1 − q)
or
p+ e1(1 − p)
e1q + (1 − q)
Case 3: w ∈ [1, 2].
S(w) =
ew−2p+ e−w+1(1− p)
e−w+1q + e−w(1 − q)
=
e2w−2p+ e1(1 − p)
e1q + (1− q)
=
p+ e1(1− p)
e1q + (1− q)
or
e2p+ e1(1− p)
e1q + (1− q)
Case 4: w ∈ [2, inf).
S(w) =
e−w+2p+ e−w+1(1− p)
e−w+1q + e−w(1− q)
=
e2p+ e1(1− p)
e1q + (1− q)
.
So in total S(w) has 3 possible values:
p+ e1(1 − p)
e1q + e2(1 − q)
≤
p+ e1(1− p)
e1q + (1− q)
≤
e2p+ e1(1− p)
e1q + (1− q)
,
and because of the inequality relation, possible values of
maxw{S(w), 1/S(w)} are
e1q + e2(1 − q)
p+ e1(1 − p)
= e
q + e(1− q)
p+ e(1− p)
,
e2p+ e1(1− p)
e1q + (1− q)
= e
ep+ (1− p)
eq + (1− q)
.
Similarly, possible values of maxw{D(w), 1/D(w)} are:
e2
q + e2(1− q)
p+ e2(1− p)
, e2
e2p+ (1− p)
e2q + (1− q)
.
Note that the first possible value of S(w) is larger whenever
the first value of D(w) is larger. (Both are quadratic centered
at 1/2.)
Assume p = 0.9, q = 0.01. Then
(max
w
{S(w), 1/S(w)})2 = e2max{5.3132, 6.2672}
max
w,w′
{D(w,w′), 1/D(w,w′)} ≥ max
w
{D(w), 1/D(w)}
=e2max{4.4695, 6.3448}
Therefore when M(X) guarantees ǫ-differential privacy,
(M(X),M(X)) cannot guarantee 2ǫ-differential privacy.
Proof: (of Theorem 3.6) By the assumption of the
theorem, for all si ∈ S, θ ∈ Θ and all w1, w2, we have
e−E ≤
P (MA(X) = w1,MB(X) = w2|si, θ)
P (MA(X) = w1|si, θ)P (MB(X) = w2|si, θ)
≤ eE ,
which is equivalent to
e−E ≤
P (MB(X) = w2|MA(X) = w1, si, θ)
P (MB(X) = w2|si, θ)
≤ eE.
For any (si, sj) ∈ Q and any w1, w2, we have
log
P (MA(X) = w1,MB(X) = w2|si, θ)
P (MA(X) = w1,MB(X) = w2|sj , θ)
= log
P (MA(X) = w1|si, θ)
P (MA(X) = w1|sj , θ)
+
log
P (MB(X) = w2|MA(X) = w1, si, θ)
P (MB(X) = w2|MA(X) = w1, sj, θ)
≤ log
P (MA(X) = w1|si, θ)
P (MA(X) = w1|sj , θ)
+
log
P (MB(X) = w2|si, θ)
P (MB(X) = w2|sj , θ)
eE
e−E
≤ǫA + ǫB + 2E.
Proof: (of Theorem 3.7) For simplicity we consider
K = 2 first.
Consider any secret pair (Xi = a,Xi = b) and
any θ ∈ Θ. Let X1Q = {Xi−a1 , Xi+b1} be the active
Markov Quilt of Xi in the first publication (with X
1
N =
{Xk}i−a1<k<i+b1 , X
1
R = {Xk}1≤k<i−a1 or i+b1<k≤T ) , and
X2Q = {Xi−a2 , Xi+b2} be that in the second (with X
2
N =
{Xk}i−a2<k<i+b2 , X
2
R = {Xk}1≤k<i−a2 or i+b2<k≤T ). De-
note XjR ∪X
j
Q as X
j
R∪Q = for j = 1, 2.
Let XR∪Q = ∪
2
j=1X
j
R∪Q. Let XN = ∩
2
j=1X
j
N , which
is guaranteed to be non-empty since it contains at least Xi.
Let XQ = {Xi−min(a1,a2), Xi+min(b1,b2)}, i.e., we pick from
Xi−a1 and Xi−a2 (and also Xi+b1 and Xi+b2 ) the ones that
are closer to Xi. Note that this is a valid Markov Quilt
of Xi, with corresponding nearby set XN and remote set
XR∪Q\XQ.
Let Z1, Z2 denote the Laplace noises added by MQM for
the two releases respectively. For simplicity, we omit the θ
term in the probabilities and assume all Xjs are distributed
according to θ. Then for any w1, w2, we have
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2|Xi = a)
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2|Xi = b)
=
∫
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2,
XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a)dxR∪Q∫
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2,
XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b)dxR∪Q
=
∫
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2|XR∪Q =
xR∪Q, Xi = a)p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a)dxR∪Q∫
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2|XR∪Q =
xR∪Q, Xi = b)p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b)dxR∪Q
≤ max
x
R∪Q
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2|XR∪Q =
xR∪Q, Xi = a)p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a)
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2|XR∪Q =
xR∪Q, Xi = b)p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b)
.
(6)
First, consider the first ratio in (6). Let XN\{i} =
XN\Xi denote all “nearby” nodes except for Xi. Let
F∗(xi, xN\{i}, xR∪Q) denote the function value of F∗ when
Xi = xi, XN\{i} = XN\{i} = xN\{i} and XR∪Q = xR∪Q.
We have for xi = a or b,
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2|
XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = xi)
=
∫
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2,
XN\{i} = xN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = xi)dxN\{i}
=
∫
p(F1(X) + Z1 = w1, F2(X) + Z2 = w2|
XN\{i} = xN\{i}, XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = xi)
p(XN\{i} = xN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = xi)dxN\{i}
=
∫
p(Z1 = w1 − F1(a, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))
p(Z2 = w2 − F2(a, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))
p(XN\{i} = xN\{i}|XR∪Q = xR∪Q, Xi = xi)dxN\{i},
where the last equality follows because Z1 and Z2 are
independent given the value of F1, F2.
Now we can consider the ratio of the above formula at
Xi = a and b. Notice that F1, F2 can change by at most
card(XN ) ≤ min{card(X
1
N ),card(X
2
N )} when XN\{i}
and Xi change. Therefore we have
max
x
N\{i}
,x′
N\{i}
p(Z1 = w1 − F1(a, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))
p(Z1 = w1 − F1(b, x′N\{i}, xR∪Q))
≤e(ǫ1−eθ(X
1
Q|Xi))/card(X
1
N )×card(XN ) ≤ eǫ1−eθ(X
1
Q|Xi),
max
x
N\{i}
,x′
N\{i}
p(Z2 = w2 − F2(a, xN\{i}, xR∪Q))
p(Z2 = w2 − F2(b, x′N\{i}, xR∪Q))
≤e(ǫ2−eθ(X
2
Q|Xi))/card(X
2
N )×card(XN ) ≤ eǫ2−eθ(X
2
Q|Xi).
Moreover, for any xi,
∫
p(XN\{i} = xN\{i}|XR∪Q =
xR∪Q, Xi = xi)dxN\{i} equals to 1. Therefore the first ratio
in (6) is upper bounded by
eǫ1+ǫ2−eθ(X
1
Q|Xi)−eθ(X
2
Q|Xi). (7)
Then we consider the second ratio in (6).
p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a)
p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b)
=
p(XR = xR|XQ = xQ, Xi = a)p(XQ = xQ|Xi = a)
p(XR = xR|XQ = xQ, Xi = b)p(XQ = xQ|Xi = b)
=
p(XR = xR|XQ = xQ)p(XQ = xQ|Xi = a)
p(XR = xR|XQ = xQ)p(XQ = xQ|Xi = b)
=
p(XQ = xQ|Xi = a)
p(XQ = xQ|Xi = b)
≤ eeθ(XQ|Xi),
where the second equality comes from the fact that XQ is
a valid Markov Quilt of Xi, and the last inequality follows
from the definition of max-influence.
Now we show that
eθ(X
1
Q|Xi) + eθ(X
2
Q|Xi) ≥ eθ(XQ|Xi). (8)
If XQ is equal to one of X
1
Q and X
2
Q, the inequality hold
trivially. Otherwise, according to Lemma 1.1, we have
eθ({Xa, Xb}|Xi) + eθ({X
2
a , X
2
b }|Xi)
≥eθ(Xmax(a1,a2)|Xi) + eθ(Xmin(b1,b2)|Xi)
≥eθ({Xmax(a1,a2), Xmin(b1,b2)}|Xi).
Combining with (7), we know that (6) is upper bounded by
eǫ1+ǫ2−eθ(X
1
Q|Xi)−eθ(X
2
Q|Xi)eeθ(XQ|Xi) ≤ eǫ1+ǫ2 .
The same analysis holds for any number of compositions.
Suppose we have {XjQ = {Xaj , Xbj}}
k
j=1 as the quilts
used in all the k runs of MQM. We can set XN to be the
intersubsection of all XjN , XR∪Q be the union of all X
j
R∪Q,
and XQ = {Xi−min({aj}), Xi+min({bj})}. Then we still have
(8); basically, apart from the two X∗Q’s each contributing to
one side of XQ, other eθ(X
∗
Q|Xi)’s are not used. So the
bound is still pretty loose; the more runs we have, the looser
the bound is.
C. Other Lemmas
Lemma 1.1: Let XS and XR be two sets of nodes in a
Bayesian network such that XS ⊆ XR. For any Θ, we have
eΘ(XS |Xi) ≤ eΘ(XR|Xi).
Proof: Let T = R\S,for any θ ∈ Θ we have
exp(eθ(XR|Xi))
= max
xR,xi,x′i
p(XR = xR|Xi = xi, θ)
p(XR = xR|Xi = x′i, θ)
= max
xS ,xT ,xi,x′i
p(XS = xS , XT = xT |Xi = xi, θ)
p(XS = xS , XT = xT |Xi = x′i, θ)
.
Then we have
eθ(XS |Xi, θ)
= max
xS ,xi,x′i
p(XS = xS |Xi = xi, θ)
p(XS = xS |Xi = x′i, θ)
= max
xS ,xi,x′i
∑
XT=xT
p(XS = xS , XT = xT |Xi = xi, θ)∑
xT
p(XS = xS , XT = xT |Xi = x′i, θ)
≤ max
xS ,xi,x′i
∑
xT
eeθ(XR|Xi)p(XS = xS , XT = xT |Xi = x′i, θ)∑
xT
p(XS = xS , XT = xT |Xi = x′i, θ)
= exp(eθ(XR|Xi)),
where the inequality is from the definition of max-influence.
Since this holds for all θ ∈ Θ, we have eΘ(XS |Xi, θ) ≤
eΘ(XR|Xi, θ).
Here we also prove a useful lemma which is similar to
the privacy guarantee of MQM proved in [9].
Lemma 1.2: For any secret pair (Xi = a,Xi = b) ∈ Q
and any θ ∈ Θ, let XQ be the Markov Quilt forXi which has
the minimum score σ(XQ), and suppose that deleting XQ
breaks up the underlying Bayesian network into XN and XR
where Xi ∈ XN . Then for any w and any realization xR∪Q
of XR∪Q,
p(F (X) + σmax · Z = w,XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a, θ)
p(F (X) + σmax · Z = w,XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b, θ)
≤ eǫ.
Proof: Pick a secret pair (Xi = a,Xi = b) ∈ Q and
any θ ∈ Θ. Let XQ be the Markov Quilt for Xi which has
the minimum score σ(XQ), and suppose that deleting XQ
breaks up the underlying Bayesian network into XN and XR
where Xi ∈ XN .
For any w and any realization xR∪Q of XR∪Q, we can write
p(F (X) + σmax · Z = w,XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a, θ)
p(F (X) + σmax · Z = w,XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b, θ)
=
p(F (X) + σmaxZ = w|Xi = a,XR∪Q = xR∪Q, θ)
p(F (X) + σmaxZ = w|Xi = b,XR∪Q = xR∪Q, θ)
·
p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a, θ)
p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b, θ)
. (9)
Consider the first ratio of (9),
p(F (X) + σmaxZ = w|Xi = a,XR∪Q = xR∪Q, θ)
p(F (X) + σmaxZ = w|Xi = b,XR∪Q = xR∪Q, θ)
.
Since F is 1-Lipschitz, when XR∪Q is fixed, F (X) can vary
by at most card(XN ) (potentially when all the variables in
XN change values). Since σmax ≥
card(XN )
ǫ−eθ(XQ|Xi)
for any Xi
with its best Markov Quilt XQ, and Z ∼ Lap(1), we know
that the above ratio is upper bounded by
eǫ−eθ(XQ|Xi).
Then consider the second part of (9). We have
p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a, θ)
p(XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b, θ)
=
p(XR = xR|XQ = xQ, Xi = a, θ)p(XQ = xQ|Xi = a, θ)
p(XR = xR|XQ = xQ, Xi = b, θ)p(XQ = xQ|Xi = b, θ)
.
Since XQ is a Markov Quilt for Xi and Xi /∈ XR, we
have p(XR|XQ, Xi = a, θ) = p(XR|XQ, Xi = b, θ). More-
over, by definition of max-influence,
p(XQ=xQ|Xi=a,θ)
p(XQ=xQ|Xi=b,θ)
≤
eeθ(XQ|Xi). Therefore the above ratio is upper bounded by
eeθ(XQ|Xi).
Combining the two ratios together, we can conclude that for
any w and any secret pair (sia, s
i
b),
p(F (X) + σmax · Z = w,XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = a, θ)
p(F (X) + σmax · Z = w,XR∪Q = xR∪Q|Xi = b, θ)
≤ eǫ.
